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Editor,
In their recent critical review titled “Assessing Cognitive Bias in
Forensic Decisions: A Review and Outlook,” Curley et al. (1)
offer a confused and incomplete discussion of “task relevance”
in forensic science. Their failure to adopt a clear and appropriate
definition of “task relevance” undermines the central conclusion
of their article—the assertion that it is not necessarily an error
for forensic scientists to rely on task-irrelevant information and
that “task-irrelevant contextual information may sometimes aid
forensic decision makers.” This conceptual flaw in the article
becomes clear when we define “task relevance” appropriately, in
the manner it was defined by the U.S. National Commission on
Forensic Science (2). The Commission’s definition provides a
bright-line standard for distinguishing contextual information that
is helpful and should be considered from contextual information
that is unhelpful and should not be considered. Once that matter
is clarified, it becomes possible to discuss intelligently whether
steps should be taken to minimize examiners’ exposure to task-
irrelevant information in order to reduce the potential for
contextual bias.
When writing about contextual bias in forensic science, com-
mentators initially used the term “domain-irrelevant” to refer to
information beyond what a forensic scientist should properly
consider (3,4). The term “task-irrelevant,” introduced by the
National Commission in 2015, represented a conceptual advance
because it recognized that the “relevance” of information to a
forensic scientist depends on the specific task the scientist is
performing. As the Commission explained,
Evidence that is task-relevant during the evidence collection
and evaluative phases may not be task-relevant during the
analytic phase. For example, statements of witnesses about
what happened during a crime may be task-relevant when
deciding what evidence to collect at a crime scene or what
examinations are needed. Such statements may also be
task-relevant when making an overall assessment of the
case in light of the forensic evidence. But witness state-
ments generally are not relevant to the task of interpreting
analytic tests. The results of analytic examinations and
comparison should depend on the physical evidence
examined, not on what witnesses say (2).
The National Commission provided a logically rigorous defi-
nition of task relevance: Information “is task-relevant for ana-
lytic tasks if it is necessary for drawing conclusions (i) about the
propositions in question, (ii) from the physical evidence that has
been designated for examination, (iii) through the correct appli-
cation of an accepted analytical method by a competent analyst”
(2). In a Technical Appendix, the Commission offered a mathe-
matical definition, saying that information is task-relevant if it
affects the conditional probability of the evidence being
examined under the propositions being considered. In other
words, information is task-relevant if it has probative value for
distinguishing the propositions the forensic scientist has been
asked to evaluate (5). It is task-irrelevant if it has no probative
value for that purpose.
Curley et al.’s claim that “task-irrelevant information may
sometimes aid forensic decision makers” rests partly on their
failure to recognize that information can be relevant to some
tasks yet irrelevant to other tasks. Their failure to draw this dis-
tinction may lead forensic scientists who perform analytic tasks
to give weight to contextual information that has no probative
value for the task they are performing and that should properly
be ignored. Consider, for example, a police report that says a
witness observed the perpetrator, who he recognized as the
defendant, touch a particular item. That information is certainly
task-relevant when the forensic scientist’s task is deciding where
to look for fingerprints, but it is task-irrelevant when the forensic
scientist’s task is deciding whether a latent print found on the
item originated from the defendant. The information in
the police report has no effect on the conditional probability of
the friction ridge patterns observed in the latent print under the
relevant propositions—that is, that the latent either did or did
not come from the defendant. Hence, this contextual information
has no probative value for fingerprint examiner’s analytic task. It
would therefore be a mistake for the examiner to give weight to
this information when comparing the prints.
Once this matter is clarified, it is possible to discuss intelli-
gently whether steps should be taken to reduce the examiner’s
exposure to task-irrelevant information in order to reduce the
potential for inadvertent contextual bias (6,7). Perhaps the collec-
tion of latent prints and the comparison of latent prints should
be conducted by different people. Perhaps the examiner who
compares the prints should not read the police report before
doing so. Whether the steps needed to reduce examiners’ expo-
sure to task-irrelevant information are worth the effort is cer-
tainly an important issue for discussion. Let’s not distract
attention from that important discussion by pretending that infor-
mation that is clearly task-irrelevant might somehow be neces-
sary and helpful to the examiner’s task.
Curley et al. also seem confused about whether forensic scien-
tists should consider the “prior odds” of the hypotheses they are
asked to evaluate. They note that this practice “may be ethically
questionable and not justified legally” but go on to suggest that
forensic scientists do it anyway because it might improve the
accuracy of their decisions. This suggestion flies in the face of
clear statements to the contrary in the National Commission’s
document on task relevance:
When performing analytic tasks, FSSPs should draw con-
clusions solely from the physical evidence that they are
asked to evaluate (along with any task-relevant context),
and not from any other evidence in the case. Fingerprint
examiners should draw conclusions from fingerprints, tool
mark examiners from tool marks, DNA experts from
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biological evidence. It would be inappropriate, for example,
if analytic conclusions were influenced by whether the sus-
pect made incriminating statements or had a criminal
record, or whether other forensic evidence implicated the
suspect. Those are matters to be considered by police, pros-
ecutors, and jurors, not matters that should influence a
scientific assessment of evidence (2).
Forensic scientists may well be able to improve their accuracy
by considering task-irrelevant information, but only by delving
into matters beyond their scientific expertise (8). Suppose, for
example, that a bite mark examiner is asked to determine
whether a defendant was the source of a mark found on a vic-
tim. The bite mark examiner may well be able to improve his
accuracy by taking into account other evidence (e.g., DNA
analysis of saliva on the skin), but the improved accuracy has
nothing to do with the examiner’s putative scientific expertise. It
arises entirely from the examiner going beyond the evaluation of
the bite mark evidence to consider evidence from other domains
—evidence that will also be considered by police, prosecutors,
and jurors. This creates the “criminalist’s paradox”: By consider-
ing task-irrelevant information, the bite mark examiner may
become more accurate, but the examiner’s testimony is difficult
to evaluate and may be misleading because it rests, in part, on
consideration of other evidence that the trier of fact will also be
considering (5,9). The increase in the examiner’s accuracy may,
paradoxically, undermine the accuracy of the legal system (5,9).
Curley et al. mention the criminalist’s paradox but seem to
dismiss it as either unimportant or as just one of several factors
to be considered when assessing whether forensic scientists
should consider “task-irrelevant” information. They never say
whether they agree or disagree with the ethical and legal objec-
tions to considering prior odds, and if so why. More importantly,
they fail to recognize that the underlying issues are not merely
about ethics or legality but concern a matter of fundamental sci-
entific importance—the proper basis for a scientific opinion in
the field of forensic science. In order to have a coherent discus-
sion of contextual bias in forensic science, and what to do about
it, we must first agree on what is the proper basis for a forensic
science opinion.
This fundamental issue was addressed squarely in the National
Commission’s erudite discussion of task relevance (which Curley
et al. unfortunately ignored). The Commission’s treatment
provides a strong conceptual foundation for analysis of these
issues. It should be the starting point when discussing what
forensic scientists should and should not consider when perform-
ing various tasks. While it is conceivable that forensic scientists’
reports might in some unusual instances be more useful to
the legal system if they consider information that falls outside
the Commission’s bright-line definition of task relevance (5), the
case for routine reliance on such information (if it can be made
at all) will need to made in a careful, rigorous manner. Forensic
scientists should be skeptical of claims that their work will bene-
fit from the use of information that, by definition, lacks proba-
tive value for distinguishing the propositions they have been
asked to evaluate. Lawyers will certainly be skeptical of such
claims.
I hope that Curley et al. will give further consideration to the
issues raised here and particularly to the National Commission’s
standard for task relevance. If they agree with the Commission’s
position, they will need to rethink much of what they said in
their article. If they disagree with the Commission’s position,
they should say why. In either case, a forthright discussion of
the proper basis for forensic science opinions will lead to more
productive discussion of contextual bias in forensic science and
what to do about it.
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